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1REcENT CASES
it can provide services such as mortgage insurance to the consumer at
more economical rates than private interests, then if to provide these
services at lower prices the Government requires exemption from
liability to which the private interests would be subjected, the argu-
ment justifying the Government's activity is fallacious. In light of the
strong argument which can be presented for interpreting the FTCA
as allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation, it is urged that
Government liability be allowed at least where the Government ac-
tivity causing plaintiff's loss has a private counterpart.
H. Jefferson Herbert, Jr.
WoK.mN's ComxPENsATioN-SET-OFFs AND DEDUCrIONS FOR RE-EMPLOY-
MENT-ABANDONMENT OF Tm "Drrr" RuLE-Claimant was employed
as a truck driver at an average weekly wage of $96.00. He sustained
a compensable injury which disabled him from driving motor vehicles,
but was thereafter employed by the same employer as a "gasser" at a
wage of $119.00 per week. The Workmen's Compensation Board made
an award for total permanent disability and denied the employer's
claim of credit for the weeks after the injury in which he employed
claimant at wages exceeding those paid prior to the injury. The
circuit court affirmed. The employer appealed, alleging several errors'
including the refusal to allow the credit claimed. Held: Affirmed. An
employer is not entitled to credit against a workmen's compensation
award for total permanent disability for weeks in which he employed
claimant at wages exceeding those paid prior to the injury.2 E. & L.
Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 841 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960).
The court's reasoning concerning the issue of credit is complex
and merits some elaboration; this requires an examination of the
history of the Ditty rule in order to show the factors that led to its
development and the justification of its final abandonment in Ken-
tucky.
The rule was first enunciated in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ditty,3
where the claimant was totally and permanently disabled from per-
forming his former work. The court held that he was entitled to
lError was alleged in the Board's (1) refusing to require further medical
examination, and (2) finding of total permanent disability. E. & L. Transp. Co. v.
Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Ky. 1960).
2 The court also held that the question of additional examinations under Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 842.205 (1960) [hereinafter cited as KRS] was within the discretion
of the Board, and that where an employee is totally disabled from performing the
work of his former occupation and his capacity to perform other kinds of work is
impaired, he is entitled to compensation for the total disability under KRS 342.095.
3 286 Ky. 395, 150 S.W.2d 672 (1941).
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maximum compensation, subject to a credit for the number of weeks
after the accident in which his employer paid him wages equal to or
exceeding the weekly compensation payments. The court assumed
that the Board considered KRS 342.115 which provides:
If an injured employe refuses employment reasonably suited to
his capacity and physical condition procured for him, he shall not be
entitled to compensation during the period of such refusal unless, in
the opinion of the board, such refusal was justifiable.4
The Board's interpretation of this statute was not discussed in the
Ditty case. However, it is implicit in what the court said, as men-
tioned in a later opinion, that "it appeared logical to conclude that
since an employee was entitled to no compensation if he refused re-
employment, the wages paid him if he [accepted] ... re-employment
would take the place of his compensation." 5 By construing the statute
in this manner, the court established a converse principle which was
to act as the basis for allowing such credit in many cases. These cases
fall into two catagories: (1) partial permanent disability; and (2)
total permanent disability.
Partial Permanent Disability
In 1942 the Ditty rule was modified to apply only where the
employee's subsequent wages equalled or exceeded those wages paid
prior to the injury.6 Because the employer was paying wages in excess
of those paid the employee prior to the injury, "it hardly [seemed] ...
fair to add to that wage compensation in any amount so long as Plain-
tiff's earning power is not affected by the injury."7 Two years later
the court refused to apply the credit rule where the injury was one for
which the award was automatically fixed by statute.8 Another limita-
tion was placed on the rule by a 1947 decision which for the first time
made it mandatory for the Board to allow credit only where wages
equalled or exceeded wages prior to the injury, and not where wages
only equalled or exceeded the amount of the compensation award.9
The allowance of credit was based on the premise that the employee
had suffered no present loss. By adopting the measure of prior wages
as a minimum requirement, the court indicated that it was attempting
4 Then Ky. Stat. § 4900 (Carroll's 1936).
5 Warner v. Lexington Roller Mills, Inc., 306 Ky. 142, 143, 206 S.W.2d 471,
472 (1947).
6 Lawson v. Wisconsin Coal Corp., 290 Ky. 375, 161 S.W.2d 600 (1942).
7 Id. at 376, 161 S.W.2d at 600.
8 Atlas Coal Co. v. Moore, 298 Ky. 767, 184 S.W.2d 76 (1944). KRS 342.105
provides for fixed compensation for enumerated partial permanent disabilities.




to make the law more certain in regard to credits. 10 The credit rule
was again applied in a 1948 case in which the court stated, "the trend
has been toward applying the rule more freely."" The court referred
to the converse interpretation of KRS 342.115 which had been applied
in previous cases.' 2 The extension of credit in cases involving partial
permanent disability came to an end 3 with the amendment of KRS
342.110 which provided: "Compensation payable under this section
shall not be affected by the earnings of the employe after the accident,
whether they be the same, or greater, or less than prior to the acci-
dent."1 4 The amendment rendered the Ditty rule inapplicable to
non-specific, as well as specific injuries.15
Total Permanent Disability
Following the Ditty case, which itself concerned total permanent
disability, came a limitation to the rule: credit was denied where the
subsequent wages were paid by a new employer rather than by the
original employer.1 In view of the fact that the claimant had been
paid wages by his fellow union members, the court reasoned that KRS
342.115'7 could not be conversely interpreted to allow credit, because
the defendant-employer had made no effort to furnish any form of
employment.' The first substantial step toward the present law of
"no-credit" was taken in a decision which denied credit where claimant
was found to be totally and permanently disabled to perform any and
all work.19 In previous cases allowing credit the claimant was found
to be totally and permanently disabled from doing a particular type of
work. This was the most outstanding precedent available when the
question of credit was raised on appeal in the principal case.
Finally, in 1952, the court denied credit against an award for total
disability although the claimant could still perform light work.20 This
10 Id. at 146, 206 S.W.2d at 473. Accord, American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp. v. Crawford, 310 Ky. 711, 221 S.W.2d 684 (1949); Browning v.
Moss Williams & Co., 306 Ky. 520, 208 S.W.2d 495 (1948).
11 Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Dusina, 308 Ky. 658, 660, 215 S.W.2d 563,
564 (1948).
Is Knott Coal Corp. v. Kelly, 313 Ky. 562, 232 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
14 This amendment was enacted by the legislature in 1948. The date 1952
in the opinion of the principal case is a typographical error. E. & L. Transp. Co.
v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Ky. 1960). See Ky. Acts 1956, ci. 77, §§ 9, 12
for phraseology extending the coverage of KRS 342.110 to occupational diseases.
15 The latest case in which this added provision of KRS 342.110 was in-
yoked to deny credit to the employer is Doan v. Cornett-Lewis Coal Co., 317
S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1958).
16 Columbus Mining Co. v. Sanders, 289 Ky. 438, 159 S.W.2d 14 (1942).
17Then Ky. Stat. § 4900 (Carrolls 1936).
18 Accord, Schaab v. Irwin, 298 Ky. 626, 183 S.W.2d 814 (1944).
19 Hall v. Black Star Coal Co., 296 Ky. 518, 177 S.W.2d 900 (1944).2 0 Anderson v. Whitaker, 247 S.W.2d 980 (Ky. 1952).
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result does not detract from the significance of the principal case, as it
might appear, because the claimant in the 1952 case was earning less
at his new job than he would have earned at the job for which he
was being trained when the accident occurred. Because of its unique
fact situation, the case itself could not be interpreted as a complete
abandonment of the Ditty rule.
21
The Ditty rule after its repeal as to partial permanent disability
cases by the 1948 amendment 22 and before the decision in the prin-
cipal case, was applicable only in cases involving total permanent dis-
ability to perform former work and where the original employer sup-
plied wages equal to or exceeding those wages paid prior to the injury.
The rule was not applicable where the employee was totally and
permanently disabled from doing any and all work. The principal case
overruled these precedents on three grounds: (1) The description
of the result reached in the Ditty case as "fair and equitable"2 3 had no
connection with the interpretation and usage of KRS 342.115; (2)KRS
342.115 was not enacted as a means to reduce compensation liability.
Logically, a converse interpretation would have no place in the
construction of a statute, the purpose of which is to encourage injured
workmen to resume employment. The employee contended that this
statute was not applicable in the principal case due to a literal inter-
pretation he placed upon it;24 (3) even conceding that KRS 342.115
could be construed as having been designed to reduce the employer's
liability, there is no basis in the language of the statute which could
support the two qualifications placed upon the credit rule: (a) wages
to be paid by the original employer; and (b) wages at least to equal
those paid prior to the accident.
The principal case leaves the law in Kentucky quite clear: "We
now declare the complete abolition of the Ditty Rule. The cases
which have announced and followed it are overruled."25
There are various theories concerning the issue of credit. Those
favoring a reduction in employers' liability contend: (1) the result is
2 1 The opinions of the court offer no theory explaining these differing con-
clusions. In the principal case the court looks beyond the former opinions to the
theory that where the Board directed credit in a total disability case, it had not
really found the claimant disabled for any and all work, but found him able to
perform light work. E. & L. Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Ky.
1960).
22 See Ky. Acts 1948, ch. 64, § 11, amending KRS 342.110.
23 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ditty, 286 Ky. 395, 396, 150 S.W.2d 672, 673
(1941).24 Brief for Appellee, p. 6, E. & L. Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240
(Ky. 1960).
25 E. & L. Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Ky. 1960).
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"fair and equitable;26 and (2) KRS 342.115 should be interpreted
conversely. However, the history of the Ditty rule is an example
of how unfounded precedent, based on nothing more than a sense
of "fairness" and an unwarranted interpretation of a statute, can
create confusion on a point of law. Prior to the principal case, the
allowance of credit in Kentucky depended on several unrelated factors:
the amount of wages,27 who paid the wages, 28 and whether the dis-
ability was total or partial.29 The employer in the instant case was
supported by these precedents; but, because of the indefinite and con-
fused reasoning in previous opinions, his position was untenable. He
argued that because there was re-employment at higher wages, the
employee lost no earning power, and consequently did not deserve
both compensation and wages.30 This was an incorrect conception of
the relationship between re-employment and earning power. Re-
employment at the same or even higher wages does not necessarily
preclude the existence of reduced earning power. Earning power is
neither absolute nor limited to the present. A loss may not appear
immediately; however, the likelihood of its occurrence at some future
date does not justify a reduction in compensation payments merely
because of a present ability to earn wages.
The general purpose of workmen's compensation legislation is "the
giving of compensation, not... denial thereof."31 The legislation was
enacted to check employers' freedom from liability and to direct the
cost of industrial injury to the consumer. The use of the Ditty rule
to reduce the amount of compensation was contrary to this legislative
intent.
One further argument in favor of the result is, "[wages] are
remuneration for work done, . . . [compensation] is indemnification
for injury sustained."82 Wages and compensation are separate con-
cepts in the law and should not be confused by an attempt to inter-
relate them. The Ditty rule failed because it did not distinguish
between these concepts in its interpretation of KRS 342.115. Certainly
if wages were actually earned, they could not later be rationally
claimed by the employer as credit. Clearly the wages were paid as a
purchase price of the employee's service, and it is untenable that they
20 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ditty, 286 Ky. 395, 150 S.W.2d 672 (1941).
27 Lawson v. Wisconsin Coal Corp., 290 Ky. 375, 161 S.W.2d 600 (1942).
28 Columbus Mining Co. v. Sanders, 289 Ky. 438, 159 S.W.2d 14 (1942).
29 Atlas Coal Co. v. Moore, 298 Ky. 767, 184 S.W.2d 76 (1944).
30 Brief for Appellant, pp. 21-22, E. & L. Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d
240 (Ky. 1960).31 Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation 476-77 (1947).
32 11 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 2319(b), at 525 (1960).
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were a substitution for disability compensation. Where the employee
performed regular work under stress of pain and physical incon-
venience the argument against credit is even stronger.3 3 The employee
should not be penalized for his desire and attempt to work under
such physical disability.
34
For these reasons the result of the principal case was justified as
another step in the expanding theory of compensation for work-
connected disabilities. The history of the Ditty rule indicates that
the Hayes rule should have been adopted earlier. The disappearance
of the credit rule will create an added incentive for the compensated
employee to return to work.35 The Hayes case will complement the
1948 amendment to KRS 342.11036 in the law of set-offs and deductions
against workmen's compensation awards.
Marshall P. Eldred, Jr.
ToRTs-NurisANcE-ImwmNmcE wrrH THE FLOW OF SUrFACE WATmaI
-Plaintiff and defendant own land on opposite sides of a highway.
The natural surface drainage is northwesterly across plaintiffs land,
under an abandoned fill, under the highway, and onto defendant's
land. Defendant constructed a fill across a creek on his land six
hundred feet northwest of the highway and installed several large
drainpipes. During an unprecedented rainfall, water backed up behind
defendant's fill and onto plaintiffs land, damaging a tenant house
and other property. The issue was submitted to the jury under
instructions based on negligence in the construction of the flll.1 Judg-
ment for defendant. Held: Affirmed. The civil law rule of absolute
liability for obstruction of surface waters was applicable under the
33 Id. at § 2319(c).
34 If the courts feel that credit should be allowed in some instances the test
should be that of intention. If the employer intends that wages be in lieu of
compensation and the employee is aware of this intention, credit might be allowed.
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 57.41 (1960). Two such examples are: an
employee not working but receiving full wages as a gratuity; and the creation of
a position in which claimant does no work.
35 The effect, if any, of the abolition of the Ditty rule on the employer will
be insignificant. The employer who re-employes a successful claimant is protected
by KRS 342.120(5), which provides that any part of an award not paid at the
time the claimant is re-employed by the original employer shall be paid out of the
Subsequent Claim Fund.
3 6 Ky. Acts 1948, ch.64, § 11.
1The basis of the decision is not clear. The court first states that the case
was given to the jury on instructions based on negligence, and later states that
admitting the proof of the inadequacy of the pipes, the vital issue in the case
was whether or not defendant's fill caused plaintiff's flooding.
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